National Research Council Questions Safety of Proposed Biocontainment Lab in Kansas

A new report by the National Research Council requested by Congress finds "several major shortcomings" in a U.S. Department of Homeland Security assessment of risks associated with operating the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kan.

A new report by the National Research Council requested by Congress finds "several major shortcomings" in a U.S. Department of Homeland Security assessment of risks associated with operating the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kan.

Under current plans, the laboratory would study dangerous foreign animal diseases — including highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease, which affects cattle, pigs, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals — and diseases deadly to humans that can be transmitted between animals and people. 

Based on the DHS risk assessment reviewed by the Research Council committee, there is nearly a 70 percent chance over the 50-year lifetime of the facility that a release of FMD could result in an infection outside the laboratory, causing economic harm to the U.S. economy estimated at between $9 billion and $50 billion. 

The report says the risks and costs of a pathogen being accidently released from the facility could be significantly higher than indicated by the assessment. Although the committee that wrote the report recognizes the need for a biocontainment facility to be built in the U.S. like the one proposed in Kansas, it was not asked to provide judgment about whether the location is appropriate for the proposed facility. 

The Research Council report noted that if FMD escapes from the NBAF, it is likely to cause a widespread and economically devastating outbreak. Roughly 9.5 percent of the U.S. cattle inventory lies within a 200-mile radius of the facility. Given that the disease is highly contagious and that the chance of its escape is not zero, rigorous and robust regional and national mitigation strategies that address an extensive outbreak of FMD are needed before the facility opens, the committee urged. 

Another concern of the committee was the lack of an early-release detection and response system, clinical isolation facilities, and world-class infectious disease clinicians experienced in diagnosing and treating laboratory staff or communities exposed to dangerous pathogens that affect people. 

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